نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشگاه شیراز
2 دانشگاه آزاد واحد مرودشت
چکیده
تمایل مدیران به بی شسرمایه گذاری، یکی از هزینه های نمایندگی است که به سبب تضاد منافع میان
مدیران و سهامداران ایجاد میشود. این بیش سرمایه گذاری ها در حالیکه منافع شخصی مدیران را
حداکثر می سازد، ارزش شرکت را کاهش میدهند. یک راه حل بالقوه برای مشکل بیش-
سرمایه گذاری، انتشار بدهی است. پژوهش حاضر به دنبال بررسی تأثیر بدهیهای بلندمدت
)استقراض( بر بیش سرمایه گذاری )در وجه نقد و مخارج سرمایه ای( و تأثیر پتانسیل رشد بر
بیش سرمایه گذاری )در وجه نقد و مخارج سرمایه ای( می باشد. جامعه آماری این تحقیق شرکت های
پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران است که بر اساس شرایط در نظر گرفته شده برای انتخاب
نمونه، 09 شرکت طی دوره 9730 تا 9730 ، انتخاب گردیده است. بهمنظور تجزیه و تحلیل اطلاعات از
تکنیک رگرسیون چندمتغیره و آزمون مقایسه میانگین استفاده شده است. یافته ها بیانگر آن است که
بین بدهی های بلندمدت و بیش سرمایه گذاری )در وجه نقد و مخارج سرمایه ای( ارتباط منفی و
معناداری وجود دارد و میانگین بیشسرمایه گذاری در وجه نقد و مخارج سرمایهای در شرکت هایی با
فرصتهای رشد کم، بالاتر می باشد.
کلیدواژه‌ها
عنوان مقاله [English]
Long-term Debts and Overinvestment in Cash and Capital Expenditures: An Agency Perspective
نویسندگان [English]
- Javad MOradi 1
- Ahmad Rahmanian 2
1
2
چکیده [English]
Managers' tendency to overinvestment is one of the agency costs that due to conflict of Interests between managements and shareholders the firms are encountered with. Whilesuchactivities increase personal interestsof managements, they will reduce the firm value. Increasing the debt is a potential solution for the overinvestment problem. This study investigates the impact of long term debts on overinvestment (with respect to cash and capital expenditures) and also, it examines the impact of growth opportunities on this overinvestment.The statistical society of this research includes companies accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) andthe sample consists of 90 firms which are selected based on some constraints for the period of 1379 to 1389. Regression analysis and t-test are utilized to examine the hypothses.The resultsshow that there is a negative and significant relationship between long-term debt changes and overinvestment (in cash and capital expenditure) and the mean of overinvestment in cash and capital expenditure in firm with less growth opportunities, is more
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
- Overinvestment in Cash
- Overinvestment in Capital Expenditures
- Long-term Debts
- Agency costs
- FreeCash Flows
- Growth Opportunities
مالی بر بیش سرمایه گذاری کم تحقیقات ،» سرمایه گذاری حسابداری، شماره ،0 - صص 01
.20
.5 مدیریت « .) شباهنگ، رضا ) 7197 مالی جلد انتشارات ،» دوم سازمان حسابرسی.
.1 ،» کیفیت گزارشگری مالی و کارایی سرمایهگذاری « .) مدرس، احمد؛ و رضا حصارزاده ) 7191
فصلنامه بورس اوراق - . بهادار، شماره دوم، صص 92 770
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