بررسی اثرات سطح افشای داوطلبانه بر عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی شرکت‏های پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشیار گروه حسابداری دانشگاه تهران

2 دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد حسابداری دانشگاه شیراز

چکیده

مدیران شرکت­­ها برای این­که سرمایه­گذاران را در مورد چشم­اندازهای آتی و اهداف و استراتژی‏های شرکت آگاه سازند، دست به افشای داوطلبانه اطلاعات می­زنند. ارائه­ی اطلاعات داوطلبانه مالی و غیرمالی در مورد شرکت باعث کاهش عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی، افزایش نقدشوندگی سهام و در نتیجه بهبود وضعیت مالی شرکت می­شود. از این رو در پژوهش حاضر، رابطه بین سطح افشای داوطلبانه و عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی شرکت­های پذیرفته شده در بازار بورس تهران مورد بررسی قرار می­گیرد. در این راستا، تأثیر اندازه شرکت، اهرم مالی، قیمت و حجم معاملات سهام نیز کنترل شده است. برای اندازه­گیری متغیر سطح افشای داوطلبانه، از چک­لیست بوتوسان (1997) که توسط کاشانی­پور و همکاران (1388) تعدیل شده است، مورد استفاده قرار گرفت که شامل 71 شاخص در شش بخش کلی پیشینه اطلاعاتی، خلاصه­ای از نتایج مهم تاریخی، آماره­های کلیدی غیرمالی، اطلاعات بخش­ها، اطلاعات پیش­بینی و بحث و تحلیل مدیریت است. همچنین متغیر عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی با استفاده از مدل ونکاتش و چیانگ (1986) اندازه­گیری شده است. برای آزمون فرضیه­ پژوهش رگرسیون چندمتغیره با استفاده از داده­های ترکیبی مورد استفاده قرار گرفته است. یافته­های بررسی 122 شرکت در دوره زمانی 1382 تا 1390 بیانگر آن است که بین سطح افشای داوطلبانه و عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی شرکت­های پذیرفته شده در بازار بورس تهران، رابطه معناداری وجود ندارد.
 

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Investigating the Impacts of Voluntary Disclosure Level on the Information Asymmetry of the Companies Listed in Tehran Stock Exchange

چکیده [English]

Managers venture to voluntary disclosure to inform investors about firms’ future point of views, goals and strategies. Financial and non-financial voluntary information reduce information asymmetry, increase stock liquidity and improve financial stability. In this research the relation of voluntary disclosure level and information asymmetry of listed companies of Tehran Stock Exchange is investigated. Botosan (1997) check list which has been adjusted by kashanipour and et al. (2009) was utilized to measure voluntary disclosure level. The check list consists of 71 indices through six section of background information, the summery of historical results, Key Non-Financial Statistics, Segments Information, Projected Information and Management Discussion and Analysis. Moreover, information asymmetry variable is measured by using Venkatash and Chiang (1986) model. To test research hypotheses multivariate regression with panel data is utilized. The results show that there is no significant relation between voluntary disclosure level and information asymmetry of 122 listed companies of Tehran Stock Exchange during 2003-2011.
 
Keywords: Voluntary disclosure level, Information asymmetry, Liquidity, Capital market.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Managers venture to voluntary disclosure to inform investors about firms’ future point of views, goals and strategies. Financial and non-financial voluntary information reduce information asymmetry, increase stock liquidity and improve financial stability. In this research the relation of voluntary disclosure level and information asymmetry of listed companies of Tehran Stock Exchange is investigated. Botosan (1997) check list which has been adjusted by kashanipour and et al. (2009) was utilized to measure voluntary disclosure level. The check list consists of 71 indices through six section of background information, the summery of historical results, Key Non-Financial Statistics, Segments Information, Projected Information and Management Discussion and Analysis. Moreover, information asymmetry variable is measured by using Venkatash and Chiang (1986) model. To test research hypotheses multivariate regression with panel data is utilized. The results show that there is no significant relation between voluntary disclosure level and information asymmetry of 122 listed companies of Tehran Stock Exchange during 2003-2011.
 
Keywords: Voluntary disclosure level, Information asymmetry, Liquidity, Capital market.
 
 
 
 
 
In this research effect of extreme and moderate cash flows in explanatory power of model when the earnings are extreme is investigated through the extended version of Easton and Harris model. In this study in period of 1385 to 1391 we had 665 firm-year observations that after the removal of outliers we reach to 594 observations. We use OLS regression that in this regression we confront with unbalanced panel data with random effect. For classification of earnings and cash flows to extreme and moderate we use quintiles. Likewise, for comparing explanatory power of the models we use Cramer's (1987) Z-statistic. After all, with attention to statistic of this test we conclude that moderate cash flows relative to extreme cash flows when the earnings are extreme have effectson explanatory power.
 
Keywords: Extreme Earnings, Moderate and Extreme Cash Flows from operation, Explanatory Power.
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this research effect of extreme and moderate cash flows in explanatory power of model when the earnings are extreme is investigated through the extended version of Easton and Harris model. In this study in period of 1385 to 1391 we had 665 firm-year observations that after the removal of outliers we reach to 594 observations. We use OLS regression that in this regression we confront with unbalanced panel data with random effect. For classification of earnings and cash flows to extreme and moderate we use quintiles. Likewise, for comparing explanatory power of the models we use Cramer's (1987) Z-statistic. After all, with attention to statistic of this test we conclude that moderate cash flows relative to extreme cash flows when the earnings are extreme have effectson explanatory power.
 
Keywords: Extreme Earnings, Moderate and Extreme Cash Flows from operation, Explanatory Power.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

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