Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1  Assistant Professor, Department of Management, Islamic Azad University, Sari,

2 Department of Accounting, Islamic Azad University, Bandargaz, Iran

3 Associate Professor, Department of Accounting, Islamic Azad University, Shahrood, Iran

4 Assistant Professor, Department of Management, Allameh Tabataba'i University

Abstract

According to the agency theory, in order to reduce the problems and agency conflicts, appropriate control mechanisms must be adopted so that the CEO moves in the interests of the shareholders and help shareholders to improve the level of transparency of financial reporting. One of these approaches is paying attention to the competitive motivations of the CEO in the form of strategies to reduce conflicts and costs arising from the formation of agency relationships. The purpose of this research is The Effect of Tournament Incentives on Financial Restatements According to the moderating role of the CEO Turnover and CEO Recruited New listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. In this study, 72 companies were considered during the period from 2010 to 2016. The hypotheses were tested through logistic regression. The results showed that the CEO's Tournament Incentives reduced the refinement of corporate financial statements. CEO tenure also revealed the impact of CEO's Tournament Incentives of the Firm restated the Financial Restatements in order to offset the negative. Ultimately, the CEO Recruited New from within the firm could help to strengthen the positive impact of the CEO's Tournament Incentives on Financial Restatements.

Keywords

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