Profitability
Reza Malek; Hossien fakhari
Abstract
The significant impact of politics on the capital market has led to a substantial body of accounting and financial research being linked to political events. Accordingly, this study investigates the effect of presidential elections on earnings management, considering the moderating role of ownership ...
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The significant impact of politics on the capital market has led to a substantial body of accounting and financial research being linked to political events. Accordingly, this study investigates the effect of presidential elections on earnings management, considering the moderating role of ownership structure. Data were collected from 122 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange using a systematic elimination method over the period 2005-2022 and analyzed using multivariate regression. The findings indicate that presidential elections have a negative and significant effect on both accrual and real earnings management. Furthermore, when industries were classified based on their political characteristics, results showed that during presidential election years, firms in politically sensitive industries tend to manage earnings through accrual-based methods, while firms in non-political industries rely more on real earnings management. The study also finds that ownership structure—specifically, the proportion of institutional ownership—does not moderate the relationship between presidential elections and earnings management (accrual or real). These findings suggest that during presidential election periods, increased scrutiny from political and social institutions raises the perceived political costs for firms, leading to a reduction in both accrual and real earnings management. Earnings Management, Ownership Structure, Political Control, Political Cost, Presidential ElectionIntroductionThe prominent role of the government in emerging economies highlights its significance in the political and economic systems of these countries (Imani Brandagh & Hashemi, 2018). Furthermore, the impact of macro-political factors on the economic performance of markets, especially capital markets, is considered inevitable (Keshavarz & Rezaei, 2021; Imani Brandagh & Hashemi, 2018). Presidential elections, by creating broad political oversight over managers, such as public scrutiny aimed at judging the economic performance of the ruling political party, oversight by rival political parties seeking to uncover corruption and financial fraud, or increased internal control by the ruling party, raise the political costs for companies. As a result, managers may reduce earnings management to avoid accusations of corruption and financial misconduct (Kim & An, 2021). According to financial literature, these consequences are defined as "political costs," and their increase may create an environment that discourages earnings management (Goncalves et al., 2022; Kim & An, 2021).On the other hand, presidential elections can generate significant political and economic uncertainty, prompting managers to increase earnings management in an attempt to neutralize the effects of these fluctuations (Goncalves et al., 2022; Moshtagh Kahnamoi et al., 2022).This study aims to examine the impact of political costs in Iran’s economic environment, as a significant consequence of presidential elections driven by increased political oversight. The importance of this study in the context of Iran can be discussed from two perspectives: first, the intense political competition among factions and political parties, and second, Iran's state-dominated economy, which is heavily influenced by governmental or quasi-governmental institutions (Fakhari et al., 2021). Literature ReviewKim and An (2021) argue that during presidential elections, increased political scrutiny raises political costs, prompting managers to reduce accrual-based earnings management to avoid accusations of financial misconduct. They attribute this to the easier detection of accrual items compared to real activities (Kim & An, 2021; Fakhari et al., 2015). Similarly, Jain et al. (2021), in their study of nine U.S. presidential election cycles (1980–2012), found that companies manipulate earnings by overproducing in pre-election years and reducing sales-related activities during election years. They also found that firms with higher agency costs reduce real earnings management during elections, while larger firms increase real earnings management in response to political-economic policies and economic uncertainty. MethodologyThis study examines the impact of presidential elections on earnings management (both accrual-based and real) and the moderating role of ownership structure, using multivariate regression over an 18-year period (2005–2022). The data were analyzed using Stata software (version 14). In line with common practices in accounting research, all continuous variables were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ResultsThe findings indicate that presidential elections have a significant negative impact on both types of earnings management—accrual-based and real. Specifically, during election years, accrual-based earnings management decreases by 1.4%, and real earnings management decreases by 1.6%. Additionally, the ownership structure (institutional ownership) does not play a moderating role in the effect of presidential elections on earnings management. Furthermore, the findings reveal that the type of earnings management differs between politically connected and non-politically connected firms. Politically connected firms reduce accrual-based earnings management due to its high detectability and the increased political costs associated with it (Kim & An, 2021). However, no significant effect was observed on real earnings management, as the political costs of real earnings management are not as high (Kim & An, 2021). For non-politically connected firms, the findings were precisely the opposite. Consistent with the overall results, the ownership structure did not have a moderating effect in either group examined. ConclusionThe findings indicate that accounting earnings are influenced by the political factor of presidential elections. Additionally, institutional ownership does not affect this relationship. In Iran's state-dominated economy, presidential elections increase political scrutiny from rival political parties, the ruling party, and society, thereby raising political costs. As a result, managers are driven to reduce both accrual-based and real earnings management to avoid financial accusations. Furthermore, politically connected firms refrain from accrual-based earnings management during presidential elections due to its high detectability and the associated political costs; however, they do not react similarly to real earnings management. This behavior stems from heightened political oversight and the increased risk of being accused of financial misconduct (Kim & An, 2021).
Profitability
Hanie Hekmat; Vahid Heydarzadeh khalife khandi; Razieh Ghorbani
Abstract
The purpose of this research is to investigate the moderating role of conservatism in the relationship between audit quality and earnings management. The current research is analytical and correlational. Furthermore, this study is considered quantitative based on the nature and characteristics of the ...
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The purpose of this research is to investigate the moderating role of conservatism in the relationship between audit quality and earnings management. The current research is analytical and correlational. Furthermore, this study is considered quantitative based on the nature and characteristics of the data used to analyze the hypotheses. Data collection involved first using the library method, followed by statistics provided by the Tehran Stock Exchange Organization. The findings obtained from the regression model, based on a sample of 110 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange over an 8-year period from 2015 to 2022, indicate that audit quality has an inverse and significant relationship with earnings management. Additionally, it was found that conservatism influences the relationship between audit quality and earnings management. The results concluded that conservatism reduces earnings management by recognizing losses promptly and delaying the recognition of profits. Since audit quality reduces information asymmetry, it limits profit manipulation through earnings management. In this context, conservatism plays a vital role in restricting managers' opportunistic reporting. Also, conservatism diminishes the company's incentives for earnings management, thereby reducing biases caused by managerial opportunism in accounting. Consequently, conservatism is expected to have a moderating role in the relationship between audit quality and earnings management, and the findings of this research confirm these expectations.IntroductionThe objective of this research is to investigate the moderating role of accounting conservatism in the relationship between audit quality and earnings management. In today's capital markets, earnings management has become a critical concern. It is a tool used by company management to influence earnings so that the numbers reach a predetermined target. This approach is employed for various reasons, one of which is earnings smoothing. As a result, instead of experiencing years of abnormally high or negative earnings, companies aim to maintain relatively stable results by employing innovative accounting tactics (Ismail et al., 2022). The main objective of financial statement auditing is to assure users that the financial statements are prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). According to IFRS, financial reporting must provide truthful information, ensuring that financial statements accurately present the information they claim to provide. It is therefore logical that audit quality has an inverse relationship with the occurrence of earnings manipulation (Ismail et al., 2022). There is also substantial research suggesting that the level of accounting conservatism may reduce the practice of earnings management (Chen et al., 2007; Ball et al., 2000; Khan & Watts, 2009; Aminu & Hassan, 2018; Li et al., 2018). Chen et al. (2007) argued for the existence of a trade-off in conservative practice. Adopting the principle of conservatism may lead to more noise in accounting reports, potentially reducing the value of the stewardship role. On the other hand, this principle may decrease the practice of earnings management. However, Chen et al., (2007) asserted that under reasonable conditions, the reduction in earnings management is sufficient to compensate for the noise caused by excessive accounting conservatism. Legislators, standard setters, and academics have expressed concern that companies use conservative accounting coverage to manage earnings (AICPA, 1939; Devine, 1963; FASB, 1980; Levitt, 1998; Penman, 2001). A significant number of previous studies link the effects of earnings management to audit quality issues (Chowdhury & Eliwa, 2021). The importance of this research lies in its effort to fill the gap in understanding the moderating role of accounting conservatism in the relationship between audit quality and earnings management. MethodologyResearch Type: Based on its objective, this research falls under the category of applied research. Applied research uses the theories, principles, and techniques developed in basic research to address practical, real-world problems. In terms of methodology and nature, this research is a correlational study. Additionally, it is considered descriptive research, as the researcher does not intervene in the position, state, or role of the variables. The research method is inductive.Data Collection: Data collection will be conducted in two stages. In the first stage, a literature review will be performed using library resources and specialized Persian and English texts to establish the theoretical and conceptual framework of the research. In the second stage, financial data for the research will be extracted from the financial statements of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange.Data Analysis: Eviews software will be used to analyze the collected data.Population and Sample: The population of this study includes all companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange between 2015 and 2022 (eight years). After applying the necessary limitations, the sample size for this research will consist of 110 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, representing 880 company-years. It is important to note that only listed companies are included in the study. ResultHypothesis 1: To test the first hypothesis of the study, Model (1) was used. The results of the model estimation show that the coefficient of audit quality (0.3645) is significant at the 5% level, indicating a significant inverse relationship between audit quality and earnings management. Among the control variables, firm size, sales growth, and research and development expenses exhibit a positive and significant relationship with earnings management, while financial leverage shows a negative and significant relationship. Additionally, it was found that book value, operating expenses, and sales volatility do not have a significant relationship with earnings management. The variance inflation factor values confirm the absence of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. The significance of the F-statistic (3674.6) at the 1% level demonstrates that the model is significant. The Durbin-Watson statistic (2.0803) indicates no autocorrelation problem in the model components. Furthermore, the coefficient of determination shows that the independent variable explains approximately 53% of the variation in total. Based on these results, the first hypothesis of the study is not rejected at the 5% confidence level.Hypothesis 2: To test the second hypothesis of the study, Model (2) was used. The results show that the coefficient of the audit quality variable (0.6577) is significant at the 5% level, indicating a significant inverse relationship between audit quality and earnings management. The coefficient of the conservatism variable (0.7305), significant at the 10% level, reveals a significant inverse relationship between conservatism and earnings management. Finally, the combined coefficient of determination for audit quality and conservatism (0.5913) is significant at the 5% level, indicating that conservatism moderates the relationship between audit quality and earnings management. The variance inflation factor values confirm the absence of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. The significance of the F-statistic (1893.6) at the 1% level demonstrates that the model is significant. The Durbin-Watson statistic (2.1972) indicates no autocorrelation problem in the model components. Furthermore, the coefficient of determination shows that the independent variable explains about 51% of the variation in total. Based on these results, the second hypothesis of the study is not rejected at the 5% confidence level. ConclusionThe results of the test for the first hypothesis indicate a significant inverse relationship between audit quality and corporate earnings management. Low audit quality occurs when audited financial statements contain errors that the auditor has not identified or disclosed in their report. Therefore, audit quality can be associated with the quality of financial reporting, as higher audit quality ensures higher reporting quality. The presence of audit quality reduces in information asymmetry, which in turn decreases earnings manipulation through earnings management. These results are consistent with the research of Hanoun et al. (2010), Alzoubi (2017), Fatahi Nafchi, and Fazel Dehkordi (2018), and Khajavi and Maimand (2015). The results of the test of the second hypothesis show that conservatism has a moderating effect on the relationship between audit quality and earnings management. Audit quality reduces information asymmetry, which subsequently decreases earnings manipulation through earnings management. In this context, conservatism plays an important role in restricting opportunistic reporting by managers. Furthermore, conservatism reduces a company's motivation for earnings management, thereby mitigating the biases caused by opportunism in accounting.
