Shokrolah Khajavi; Ahmad Shokrollahi
Abstract
The interaction of managerial ownership and corporate performance in accordance with their endogenous nature is studied in this research. In other words, interrelations of mentioned variables along with some relevant variables of using three stage simultaneous equations and panel data are inquired. To ...
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The interaction of managerial ownership and corporate performance in accordance with their endogenous nature is studied in this research. In other words, interrelations of mentioned variables along with some relevant variables of using three stage simultaneous equations and panel data are inquired. To do this, quasi-research method is used for 134 listed companies of Tehran Stock Exchange during period of 1380 to 1389. Results of testing research hypotheses indicate positive significant effectiveness of performance on managerial ownership. The most important factors of making managerial ownership which lead to better performance are considered as bonus shares of management bonus plan and information asymmetry problem. Moreover, results of research do not confirm performance effectiveness from managerial ownership. Thus, research findings do not verify this predicate that “due to coordination of management and tockholders’ interests increasing managerial ownership causes agency expenses decreases and increases in stockholders’ interests
Mohammad Namazi; Javad Moradi
Volume 3, Issue 10 , July 2005, , Pages 73-101
Abstract
In today's developed corporations, because of multiplicity of owners, direct monitoring of managers' performance is impossible, but this group only realizes the released benefits. Therefore, it is reasonable that they use governance mechanisms, for monitoring and optimal controlling behavior of hired ...
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In today's developed corporations, because of multiplicity of owners, direct monitoring of managers' performance is impossible, but this group only realizes the released benefits. Therefore, it is reasonable that they use governance mechanisms, for monitoring and optimal controlling behavior of hired managers. One means in reaching this purpose is rewarding managers based on their performance and motivating them, in accordance with the firm's purposes, in the manner discussed in the agency theory.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the agency theory implications to isolate market determinants of board of director's bonuses, on the basis of data collected from Tehran's Securities Exchange (TSE) market for 1378 to 1382. For this purpose, by utilizing a regression model, board of director's bonus for selected corporation, were related to some accounting and market-based performance measures as well as some fixed variables (with respect to performance) such as the firm's size and the ownership concentration.
The results at the level of all corporations suggest that there is a significant relationship between Return on Assets (ROA) ratio and its changes, firm's size, ownership centralization, financial risk and board of directors' bonus. At the industry level, both the firm's size and ROA ratio were used more than the other selected variables. By substituting "changes in bonus" for the bonus itself, the explanatory power of the model used, was weakened. In this stage, the only variable that is significantly related to changes in bonuses is the ROA ratio.
Mohammad Namazi; Mohammad Sayrani
Volume 2, Issue 5 , April 2004, , Pages 25-60
Abstract
This research is carried out by the use of agency theory in considering twoimportant subjects: - Relation of giving bonus to CEO which is compensation plan from accounting profit, profit growth, and Market Value Added (M.V.A.) -Studying important structures in identifying bonus of CEO's. ...
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This research is carried out by the use of agency theory in considering twoimportant subjects: - Relation of giving bonus to CEO which is compensation plan from accounting profit, profit growth, and Market Value Added (M.V.A.) -Studying important structures in identifying bonus of CEO's. In the first case, from the gathered information of profit making companies accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange ( T.S.E. ) in the years 1376 to 1380. Methods used in variance and regression analysis. In the second case measurement research has been done by submitting some form of questioners and gathering viewpoint of managing directors and consultants of holding companies, investment companies and industrial organizations by statistical techniques, binomial test and analysis of variance test and Kruskal- wallis test. At the end, analysis and results research, the summery of above cases has been submitted.
