stock exchange
Hasan Farajzadeh; Aَfsane Dehghan Dehnavi
Abstract
This study investigates the spillover effects in the disclosure timing of financial statements among peer firms, taking into account the deadlines stipulated by the Executive Regulations on Information Disclosure for registered firms under the Securities and Exchange Organization. The findings reveal ...
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This study investigates the spillover effects in the disclosure timing of financial statements among peer firms, taking into account the deadlines stipulated by the Executive Regulations on Information Disclosure for registered firms under the Securities and Exchange Organization. The findings reveal the presence of peer effects in the disclosure timing of pre-audited interim and annual financial statements, as a result of peer competition to attract market attention and mimicry in disclosure behavior. In contrast, no spillover effect is observed in the disclosure timing of the audited financial statement. Furthermore, the results provide insights into competition for market attention among peer firms when releasing semi-annual audited financial statements for clients audited by non-private audit firms (i.e., the Audit Organization and Mofid Rahbar Institute). This suggests a potential value-added role of non-private audit firms in enhancing the credibility of interim audited financial statements. The presence of a spillover effect in unaudited disclosures, contrasted with its absence in audited disclosures, may be attributed to the higher costs of accelerating the release of audited financial statements and the strategic timing of unaudited disclosures to elicit a desired market response.Introduction and Theoretical BackgroundFinancial disclosure is a critical component of corporate transparency, influencing investor decisions, regulatory oversight, and market efficiency. While prior research has extensively examined the content of financial disclosures, the timing of these disclosures remains an underexplored aspect of corporate strategy. Firms face a trade-off between timely disclosure, which may offer a competitive advantage, and the associated costs, including compliance requirements and managerial discretion.A growing body of literature suggests that firms do not make disclosure decisions in isolation but are influenced by the behavior of their peers. The concept of peer effects posits that firms within the same industry observe and often mimic the timing strategies of their competitors. This imitation may be driven by a desire to manage investor perceptions, respond to competitive pressures, or align with industry norms.The theoretical foundation of this study is rooted in signaling theory and the theory of strategic disclosure. According to signaling theory, firms disclose financial information strategically to convey positive signals to investors and differentiate themselves from competitors. Strategic disclosure theory further asserts that firms adjust their disclosure practices in response to market conditions and the actions of their peers, aiming to maximize market attention and investor confidence.Additionally, research on financial market efficiency suggests that early disclosures receive more market attention than later ones, creating incentives for firms to strategically time the release of their financial statements. Firms that delay disclosures risk negative investor sentiment or diminished market responsiveness. Consequently, understanding the peer-driven dynamics of disclosure timing provides valuable insights into how firms navigate regulatory constraints and competitive pressures.This study aims to fill a gap in the existing literature by examining whether firms align their financial disclosure timing with that of their industry peers, and how this behavior differs between audited and unaudited financial statements. By analyzing disclosure patterns over an extended period, this research sheds light on the broader implications of peer effects in corporate financial communication.Research MethodologyThis study employs a quantitative research design using archival financial data from 242 firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange between 2011 and 2022. The analysis is conducted through econometric modeling to measure the relationship between the disclosure timing of focal firms and that of their industry peers. Key variables include the timing of audited and unaudited financial statement disclosures, firm size, leverage, and auditor type. A regression model is used to assess whether firms adjust their disclosure timing based on peer behavior, while controlling for industry and firm-specific factors.Results and FindingsThe empirical findings suggest a strong peer effect in the timing of unaudited financial statements, where firms tend to align their disclosure timing with competitors to attract market attention. This pattern is particularly evident among firms with high market visibility, indicating that competitive pressures influence disclosure timing decisions.However, no significant peer effects are observed in the timing of audited financial statements. This may be attributed to stringent regulatory requirements and the involvement of independent auditors, which limit managerial discretion in disclosure timing. Additionally, firms audited by government-affiliated audit firms demonstrate greater synchronization in their disclosure timing, highlighting the potential influence of audit firm reputation on disclosure strategies.Another notable finding is that firms competing for market attention tend to accelerate their disclosure timing to differentiate themselves from peers. The results indicate that firms operating in highly competitive industries are more likely to engage in strategic disclosure timing to gain a competitive advantage in capital markets.Furthermore, the study finds that firms with larger market capitalization and higher leverage ratios tend to experience longer disclosure delays, reflecting the complexity of financial reporting processes in such firms. These findings support the hypothesis that firms strategically manage disclosure timing based on industry competition and firm-specific characteristics. ConclusionThis study provides empirical evidence that firms engage in strategic disclosure timing influenced by peer behavior. While unaudited financial statements exhibit a strong contagion effect, audited statements do not follow the same pattern, likely due to higher associated costs and regulatory constraints. The findings suggest that firms actively monitor their peers' disclosure practices and adjust their own timing decisions to maximize market attention.From a regulatory perspective, these results highlight the need for policies that consider the competitive dynamics of disclosure timing. Understanding peer-driven disclosure behaviors can help regulators refine disclosure rules to enhance market transparency and prevent firms from manipulating disclosure timing for competitive advantages.The implications of this study extend to both investors and corporate managers. Investors should be aware of the strategic motivations behind disclosure timing, while managers should consider the potential reputational risks associated with delaying financial disclosures. Future research could explore the effects of industry-specific regulations and investor reactions on disclosure timing strategies, as well as the long-term consequences of disclosure timing for firm valuation and market efficiency.
Hassan Farajzadeh Dehkordi; Leila Aghaei
Volume 12, Issue 45 , April 2015, , Pages 97-114
Abstract
This paper investigates the relation between fraudulent financialreporting and firms’ dividend policies. Specifically, this researchconcentrated on situations that it is possible to classify financialrestatement into fraudulent and non-fraudulent based on themanagement’s incentives for discretionary ...
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This paper investigates the relation between fraudulent financialreporting and firms’ dividend policies. Specifically, this researchconcentrated on situations that it is possible to classify financialrestatement into fraudulent and non-fraudulent based on themanagement’s incentives for discretionary accounting choices .The data is related to 247 firms (consisted of 2,238 firm-yearobservation) during 1381-1390. A Meet-or-beat model was used toclassify firms as making discretionary accounting choices foropportunistic meet-or-beat. Furthermore, a fixed effects logisticregression with panel data was used to test hypothesis. Results showthat dividend-paying firms have less likelihood to engage infraudulent financial reporting furthermore, the negative associationbetween dividend paying status and fraudulent financial reporting isstronger when the size of dividend payouts is larger .Overall, resultssuggest firm’s dividend policy is indicative of its earnings quality.Specifically, dividend policy unfolds the manager’s incentives forfinancial restatements.
Abstract
While perior studies faild to document a meaningful relationship between financial restatement, as a measure of earnings quality, and firms’ dividend paying policy, the purpose of the present study is to reinvestigate this relationship by classifying financial restatements into opportunistic and ...
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While perior studies faild to document a meaningful relationship between financial restatement, as a measure of earnings quality, and firms’ dividend paying policy, the purpose of the present study is to reinvestigate this relationship by classifying financial restatements into opportunistic and non-opportunistic based on management incentives in using discretionary accruals. The data is related to 247 firms (consisted of 2,238 firm-year observations) during 1381-1390. A Meet-or-beat model was applied to determine opportunistic financial reporting. Furthermore, a fixed effects logistic regression with panel data was used to test hypothesis. Results show that dividend-paying firms have less likelihood to engage in opportunistic financial reporting through fincial restatements. Furthermore, the negative association between dividend paying status and opportunistic financial reporting is stronger when the size of dividend payouts are larger. Overall, results suggest firm’s dividend policy is indicative of its earnings quality. Specifically, dividend policy unfolds the manager’s incentives behind the financial restatements.
